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BRUCE E. CAIN* & EMILY R. ZHANG† 
Considerable evolution in American political party coalitions 
threatens to undermine the gains that minorities have made in 
political representation and participation. Since the migration of 
Southern white conservatives to the Republican Party, party 
identification has become more consolidated and consistent. As the 
parties have become more distinct from each other, they have also 
become more internally ideologically consistent. This assortative 
political sorting has been accompanied by the strengthening of racial 
partisan identification, leading to a conjoined polarization of party, 
ideology, and race. Conjoined polarization complicates and 
undermines the efforts of an earlier time to protect minority voting 
rights, most notably through the passage of the Voting Rights Act. This 
Article evaluates the effect of conjoined polarization on two main 
kinds of litigation under the Voting Rights Act: redistricting and 
election administration. Conjoined polarization aligns political 
contestation along racial lines. All attempts to manipulate the political 
process—through drawing gerrymandered district lines or erecting 
barriers to vote—will have decidedly racial consequences; yet, 
existing doctrine is either ill-equipped, or ill-defined to address them. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court’s racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence will struggle to reign in partisan 
gerrymandering in the 2020 redistricting cycle. And the protection of 
minority voting rights in election administration will depend on the 
ability of courts to translate section 2’s protections developed in vote 
dilution cases to vote denial cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and amended it five times 
throughout a period of critical transformation in American politics.1 From the 
start of the Nixon Administration to the end of Reagan’s, social conservatives 
migrated geographically and politically towards the Republican Party while 
African-American and Latino voters increasingly coalesced with liberal white 
                                                                                                                     
 1 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/YTZ4-
DVXZ] (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1970, 1975, 
1982, 1992, and 2006. Id. Examples of amendments to the Act include: Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-73, 89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 
131; Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921; 
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577; and Act of July 1, 
2008, Pub. L. 110-258, 122 Stat. 2428. The Voting Rights Act is codified at 52 U.S.C. 
§§ 10101–10702 (Supp. II 2014). 
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Democrats.2 This changing composition of electoral coalitions is known as 
party sorting.3 
Party coalitions can become more assortative (members of a party being 
more homogenous) or disassortative (more heterogeneous).4 The American 
party duopoly has accommodated both types of coalitions at various times in 
its history. From the end of World War II to the 1960s, the Democratic and 
Republican Party coalitions were comparatively heterogeneous due to the 
presence of Northern liberals and moderates among Republicans and Southern 
conservatives among Democrats.5 But since 1965, party sorting has been 
assortative rather than disassortative.6 The two major party coalitions have 
become much more ideologically consistent, creating higher levels of partisan 
polarization and more frequent legislative stalemates at both the state and 
federal levels.7 The ideological sorting has been accompanied by racial sorting 
as well, pitting a predominantly white Republican party against a racially 
diverse Democratic one.8 President Barack Obama’s 2008 election might have 
raised hopes that the United States had finally overcome racialized politics, but 
there are few, if any, who would claim that today.  
The more consistent alignment of race, party, and ideology since 1965—
i.e. conjoined polarization—has complicated and undermined efforts under the 
Voting Rights Act to protect the voting rights of historically underrepresented 
racial and ethnic minorities. The passage and maintenance of the Voting 
Rights Act was possible as a result of relative heterogeneity in the Democratic 
and Republican parties.9 Conjoined polarization threatens the bipartisan 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See infra Part II.A. 
 3 Political scientists debate how the phenomenon ought to be described. It is also 
referred to as “polarization.” We find the term “party sorting” more apt, since it better 
captures the movement between the adherents of the two parties that account for the 
political phenomenon. For further discussion on the two terms, see generally Morris P. 
Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class Versus the People, 
in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION? 49 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006). 
 4 See id. at 53–54. 
 5 See Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of 
Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 17 (Nathaniel 
Persily ed., 2015). 
 6 See id.  
 7 Id. at 15. 
 8 See infra note 9. 
 9 For a deeper discussion of how the two parties diverged in their treatment of race, 
see EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 27–58 (1989). While the Republican Party as a 
whole slowly ceased advocating for civil rights, it nonetheless contained enough legislators 
who were supportive of civil rights legislation in the ’50s and ’60s to help aid in the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. Heterogeneity in the Democratic 
Party was also present during this period. In response to electoral competition from the 
Republican Party, Southern Democrats generally liberalized their positions and moved 
closer to Northern Democrats, although there was, into the 1980s, “considerable variation” 
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consensus that heterogeneous parties allowed. Democrats, previously divided 
over voting rights legislation, now support it firmly.10 The Republicans, 
having supported the Voting Rights Act in the past, now refuse to consider any 
efforts to revive section 5 or broaden the law to prohibit new forms of voter 
restrictions.11  
Conjoined polarization is responsible for the parties’ changing tactics in 
redistricting. Redistricting under the Voting Rights Act has historically been 
focused on African-American underrepresentation and primarily threatened 
Southern white Democrats.12 The initial section 2 and section 5 redistricting 
remedies often removed African-American voters from districts represented by 
white Democratic incumbents in order to fashion new majority-minority 
districts.13 In essence, they cracked the Democratic vote and opened up 
previously safe Democratic seats to competition from Republicans. 
But demographics threaten to change the political logic behind minority 
rights redistricting. With the Latino population spreading out into rural and 
suburban Republican areas around the country,14 the partisan tactical 
                                                                                                                     
in their tendencies to support liberal policies. Richard Fleisher, Explaining the Change in 
Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats, 55 J. POL. 327, 338–39 (1993). 
 10 Certainly, after President Johnson, the Democratic Party has come to be identified 
as the party advocating for racial liberalism. See CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 9, at 
51–52. But that transformation took time. 
 11 The Voting Rights Act was first co-sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Everett 
Dirksen, a Republican from Illinois, in 1965 as S. 1564. Voting Rights Act, ASS’N CTRS. 
FOR STUDY CONGRESS, http://acsc.lib.udel.edu/exhibits/show/legislation/vra [https://per 
ma.cc/FT3Q-DB7S]. After the bill was introduced, it was co-sponsored by an additional 
twenty Republicans. Id. Today, such bipartisan support for the Voting Rights Act is 
unimaginable. After Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), Republicans have 
stalled efforts to pass a restored Voting Rights Act. In control of both the House and the 
Senate, Republicans have refused to conduct hearings over new voting rights legislation. 
See The Voting Rights Act Is 51 and Voter Discrimination Is Flourishing Again, VRA FOR 
TODAY (Aug. 5, 2016), http://vrafortoday.org [https://perma.cc/SLM5-RMS9]. 
 12 See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 36–37, 170 (1995); Chandler Davidson, The Recent 
Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET 
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 21, 26–27 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 
1994); Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black 
Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111, 112, 125 (1991); J. 
Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES 
IN MINORITY VOTING 135, 144–45 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
 13 These are districts in which minorities constitute the majority of the population. In 
these districts, minorities have the ability to elect their representatives of choice. For a 
history on the creation of such districts, see generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting 
Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 12, at 7–
51. 
 14 Daniel T. Lichter & Kenneth M. Johnson, Emerging Rural Settlement Patterns and 
the Geographic Redistribution of America’s New Immigrants, 71 RURAL SOC. 109, 110–11 
(2006); Daniel T. Lichter, Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural America, 77 
RURAL SOC. 3, 4, 7–51 (2012). 
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advantage in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act is no longer so clear. 
The growing Hispanic population demands its own ability-to-elect districts.15 
These districts can be created by removing low voting Hispanic populations 
from Republican seats and replacing them with either one of two options, both 
to the detriment of Republicans. First, the Hispanic population may be 
replaced with higher voting white Democrats, drawing them away from 
previously safe Republican districts and therefore rendering those seats more 
competitive. The alternative is to replace the Hispanic population with more 
Republican voters, packing Republican voters inefficiently into districts where 
Republican control is likely. Demographic change was turning the Voting 
Rights Act into an equal opportunity weapon that Republicans were 
susceptible to as well.  
The slow change in politics and demographics was accompanied by a 
drastic legal change in 2013. The Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder 
struck down the coverage formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act,16 
hence neutralizing the preclearance regime set out under section 5.17 Post 
Shelby County, the political prospects of a bipartisan effort to revive section 5 
by fixing its section 4 coverage formula are currently dim. In addition to 
removing section 5 protections for the next round of redistricting, this decision 
eliminated a crucial tool for scrutinizing and precluding the implementation of 
possible second-generation barriers to voting, such as new voter ID 
requirements and other laws that can make voting more difficult for 
disadvantaged populations.18 Predictably, racial, partisan, and administrative 
motives have blurred. Many Republicans believe that looser voter qualification 
laws favor the Democrats and encourage voter impersonation fraud.19 
                                                                                                                     
 15 A Look at Remaining Map Disputes: Treatment of Hispanics in North Texas, TEX. 
REDISTRICTING & ELECTION L. (Apr. 17, 2013), http://txredistricting.org/post/48186394247/a-
look-at-remaining-map-disputes-treatment-of [https://perma.cc/52HM-PYCD] (discussing 
the creation of more Hispanic ability-to-elect districts in Texas). 
 16 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627, 2631–32. 
 17 Under section 5 preclearance, states covered under section 4 seeking to enact or 
administer “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting,” must first have those changes precleared by the 
Department of Justice (or obtain an declaratory judgment from the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia) before they can be implemented. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) 
(Supp. II 2014). 
 18 Voting qualifications like photo ID laws, or removal of early voting opportunities, 
would have been covered under section 5 if not for Shelby County. See id. This is not to say 
that states would have been uniformly precluded from implementing such qualifications, 
but certainly, the preclearance regime would have closely scrutinized the motives behind 
their implementation and evaluated their effects. 
 19 See Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of the Recent State Voter 
ID Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 185–88 (2009). Voter ID laws 
have been almost universally passed by Republicans, and opposed by Democrats. Id. For 
further discussion of the partisan nature of election administrative reforms, see infra Part 
III.B.1. 
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Democrats believe otherwise and suggest that the administrative justifications 
are pretexts for racially motivated vote suppression.20 
As they battle for control of Congress and state legislatures, the parties 
fight for every tactical advantage, raising the stakes for electoral rule disputes. 
Even seemingly mundane decisions about ballot types, early voting, precinct 
consolidations, or voter identification laws have potentially important political 
and racial consequences. Expand the electorate to include more Latinos, and 
Democrats seemingly gain. Add more voting qualifications, and Republicans 
think that they might exclude Democratic voters and win a few more seats. 
Disentangling partisan aims from racial motives and pretext from legitimate 
considerations about ballot security, cost, and the like is harder than ever.  
In the Parts of this Article that follow, we will first review the concept and 
evidence of conjoined polarization. Then, we will discuss how it has 
complicated the application of the Voting Rights Act to redistricting and 
election administration. The conflation of party and race under conjoined 
polarization prevents existing redistricting doctrines from protecting minority 
voting rights. It has also ignited heated disputes over election administration 
that the post-Shelby County Voting Rights Act is ill-equipped to handle or 
adjudicate. The system might correct itself if the party coalitions become more 
ideologically and racially diverse in the future. But failing that, we argue that 
the courts should closely scrutinize the evidence of fraud and the burdens 
associated with new voter requirements and administrative changes that reduce 
opportunities to vote. With respect to redistricting, the courts need help from 
the political process in order to limit egregious bias. The burden falls on state 
and local jurisdictions to define what they mean by impermissible political 
unfairness. Emerging evidence-based standards put forth by social scientists 
will aid in that endeavor. 
II. CONJOINED POLARIZATION 
A. Description of Conjoined Polarization 
American politics has become decidedly more polarized in the last two 
decades.21 By political polarization, we mean the persistent and growing 
ideological gap between adherents of the two major political parties.22 Another 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 41–73 (2012). 
 21 Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political Polarization in the American 
Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563, 574, 577, 584 (2008). The precise way to characterize 
what has happened is up for some debate: some refer to the phenomenon as polarization, 
while others use the term party sorting. We refer to the observed outcome of the parties 
drifting apart as polarization, and use the term party sorting to explain the demographic 
shifts in party identification that accounts for the observed outcome of polarization. See 
discussion supra note 3. 
 22 For a discussion of polarization in Congress, see generally NOLAN MCCARTY ET 
AL., POLARIZED AMERICA (2006). For a dissenting view on the polarization in the electorate 
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way to think of polarization is that there is increasingly less overlap in what 
the two parties stand for. Polarization is the centrifugal force that draws the 
two parties farther away from each other, and also from the center.23 
Democrats and Republicans today can reliably be expected to hold certain 
policy and ideological positions. Two decades ago, partisan labels were much 
less predictive of the views that an individual held.24 In more colorful terms, 
polarization has made the country more red and blue, and less purple. 
Polarization along partisan lines also has a racial dimension. The 
campaign, election, and reelection of President Obama spawned significant 
academic research on the parallel growth of racial and partisan polarization.25 
Such racial polarization is evident in President Obama’s election returns: in 
the 2008 election, he lost the white vote by 20%, but won with a nonwhite 
margin of 62%.26 
The roots of racial polarization run much deeper. The civil rights 
movement divided the population on racial issues and caused party 
attachments to form along racial lines.27 Such racial polarization has not only 
                                                                                                                     
see ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, 
POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–5 (2010). 
 23 Polarization is commonly understood as the “division into two opposites” or the 
“concentration about opposing extremes of groups or interests formerly ranged on a 
continuum.” Polarization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/polarization [https://perma.cc/829N-KLN2]. 
 24 Political scientists describe this phenomenon in the language of “constraints.” See 
John L. Sullivan et al., Ideological Constraint in the Mass Public: A Methodological 
Critique and Some New Findings, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 233, 233–35 (1978). Theoretically, 
one’s ideological position on abortion and climate change need not be connected, but often, 
they are bundled. See id. at 233–35, 247–48. Another way to understand polarization is that 
those constraints have strengthened over time. See id. at 233. Believing in the virtues of 
small government has come to be paired with climate change skepticism and gun right 
enthusiasm. In a polarized polity, knowing one’s political views on a single issue can 
strongly predict one’s views on a whole host of other issues.  
 25 By the end of President Obama’s first year in office, African-Americans and white 
Americans were separated by fifty percentage points in their presidential approval 
ratings—a distance already significantly larger than the racial polarization at any time 
during Ronald Reagan’s and George H.W. Bush’s presidencies. Michael Tesler & David 
O. Sears, President Obama and the Growing Polarization of Partisan Attachments by 
Racial Attitudes and Race 2 (Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished paper), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642934 [https://perma.cc/D464-XBSV]. 
 26 Alan Abramowitz, The Emerging Democratic Presidential Majority: Lessons of 
Obama’s Victory 10 (2013) (unpublished paper), http://themonkeycage.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/abramowitz_emerging_majority.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN3V-WE88] 
(according to nationwide exit poll). 
 27 CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 9, at 47. Although there is evidence that the 
racial attachment had waned by the Clinton years, if not for President Obama, we may have 
seen a continued decline in the association between the Democratic party and African-
Americans. Cf. Abramowitz, supra note 26, at 2 (“Obama’s 2012 victory reflected the 
impact of demographic and cultural trends that are transforming the American electorate 
and the American party system.”). 
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caused African-Americans and other minorities to more closely associate with 
the Democratic Party, it has also had an effect on whites. Political scientists 
have found a notable increase in the effects of racial resentment28 on white 
partisanship from 1988 to 2000.29 
B. The Explanation for Conjoined Polarization  
What caused party sorting, and how did it come to correlate with race and 
ideology? In retrospect, many moving pieces coincided to produce this trend. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, the South, due to the legacy of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, was still a Democratic stronghold, with racial 
conservatives in an uneasy coalition with Northern liberals.30 Congressional 
committee chairs in this period wielded a great deal of power over whether 
bills and amendments made it onto the floor, and many of them were from the 
South.31 
A common refrain in political science during this period was that electoral 
or party trends would generally hold, “except in the South.”32 Looking back, 
we can see that ideological heterogeneity in both parties served as an internal 
check on centrifugal drift. For the Democrats, the modulating effect of 
ideological diversity waned as the tenuous alliance between Southern 
conservatives and Northern liberals eroded during the 1960s due to the 
Vietnam War, the sexual revolution, and the civil rights movement.33 While 
the story of President Johnson declaring that signing the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 would cause the Democratic Party to lose the South forever is likely 
                                                                                                                     
 28 Racial resentment is measured through a proxy by asking whether people agree 
with the statement, “We should make every possible effort to improve the position of 
blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment.” American 
Values Survey: Question Database, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.people-press.org/values-
questions/q40l/make-every-effort-to-improve-the-position-of-minorities-including-prefer 
ential-treatment/#total [https://perma.cc/GV7J-WXQJ]. While imperfect, political scientists 
have found that views on affirmative action are closely tied to racial conservatism. See, 
e.g., David O. Sears et al., Is it Really Racism? The Origins of White Americans’ 
Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 16, 17, 30 tbl.3, 31 (1997); 
Tesler & Sears, supra note 25, at 18. 
 29 Tesler & Sears, supra note 25, at 12. See id. for evidence that “the impact of racial 
resentment on white party identification reached its apex in 2008, growing by 75 percent of 
its 2004 size. With that enhanced effect, a change from least to most racially resentful now 
independently increased Republican partisanship by 20 percent of the party identification 
scale’s range.” Tesler and Sears argue that “Obama’s presidency has, in fact, opened the 
door for old fashioned racism to influence white partisanship.” Id. at 18. 
 30 See EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH 235 
(1987); Nicholas A. Masters, Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives, 55 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 345, 355–56 (1961). 
 31 See Masters, supra note 30, at 348, 353 tbl.3. 
 32 See generally BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN 
EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH (2006). 
 33 See id. at 53–54. 
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apocryphal,34 the prophecy’s fame derives in part from its truth. As the 
Democratic Party became more heavily identified with liberal causes and 
Presidential candidates, Southern and socially conservative Democrats began 
to defect to Republican candidates, with many eventually switching their party 
identification.35  
On the Republican side, social issues such as abortion and women’s rights 
created a coalitional divide, one that deepened as the party’s base moved to the 
South.36 The ranks of fiscally conservative and socially moderate Republicans 
gradually thinned, and the overlap between the most conservative Democratic 
and liberal Republican representatives got progressively smaller, as evident in 
various measures and interest group ratings of Congress.37 
Hence, the driving force behind party sorting was the movement of 
socially conservative white voters from the Democratic Party to the 
Republican Party.38 The two major parties and their candidates made fateful 
political and electoral choices regarding civil rights and social issues that 
caused some supporters and officials to convert from one party to the other. 
Physical, geographic sorting in the form of internal migration accelerated party 
sorting. Liberal and conservative whites sorted not only according to ideology 
but also with regard to where they lived and worked. Liberal whites moved to 
creative urban hubs like the Bay Area, Boulder, Seattle, Austin, etc., and 
conservative whites migrated to the South, exurbs, and rural communities.39 
The younger conservatives who eventually replaced the Reagan and Blue Dog 
Democrats no longer identified or registered with the Democratic Party.40 
Meanwhile, nonwhite voters increased in numbers and were attracted in 
the opposite direction by the more liberal positions of the Democratic Party. 
Where domestic migration accounted for white social sorting, documented and 
undocumented immigration accounted for much of the nonwhite social 
                                                                                                                     
 34 Steven J. Allen, “We Have Lost the South for a Generation”: What Lyndon 
Johnson Said, or Would Have Said if Only He Had Said It, CAP. RES. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://capitalresearch.org/2014/10/we-have-lost-the-south-for-a-generation-what-lyndon-
johnson-said-or-would-have-said-if-only-he-had-said-it/ [https://perma.cc/L7NS-L85E]. 
 35 Kevin A. Hill & Nicol C. Rae, What Happened to the Democrats in the South? US 
House Elections, 1992–1996, 6 PARTY POL. 5, 6 (2000). 
 36 See Richard Fleisher & John R. Bond, The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress, 
34 BRITSH J. POL. SCI. 429, 433 (2004). 
 37 KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 166–74 (2000).  
 38 Michael Lind, This Is What the Future of American Politics Looks Like, POLITICO 
MAG. (May 22, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-
realignment-partisan-political-party-policy-democrats-republicans-politics-213909 
[https://perma.cc/ED5Z-CVM6]. 
 39 See, e.g., Wendy K. Tam Cho et al., Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of 
the American Electorate, 103 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 856, 857–60 (2012); 
Tony Robinson & Stephen Noriega, Voter Migration as a Source of Electoral Change in 
the Rocky Mountain West, 29 POL. GEOGRAPHY 28, 28, 37 (2010). 
 40 See Hill & Rae, supra note 35, at 18–19. 
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sorting.41 As Latinos—and to a lesser extent, Asians—entered the country, 
many ended up residing in cities, following jobs and available low income 
housing stock.42 Together with white liberals, urban dwellers became loyally 
Democratic and more liberal.43 When the Voting Rights Act ended districting 
practices that had previously fractured minority areas, it enabled these 
communities to elect their representatives of choice.44 The Democrats became 
more ideologically consistent both by addition (of minority voters) and 
subtraction (through the defection of socially conservative whites).  
Racial sorting and party sorting trends have been closely intertwined. Civil 
rights policies gave socially conservative white Democrats reason to defect to 
the Republican Party.45 Immigration policies also enabled the nonwhite and 
non-European population to grow and eventually enter a coalition with liberal 
whites. At the same time, both parties became more ideologically consistent, 
with more within-party conformity in social and economic policy.46 This 
undercut the ideological heterogeneity that in the immediate post World War 
II era had limited the polarization of activists, donors, and representatives in 
both parties. The Democratic and Republican parties became more 
ideologically consistent and racially distinctive.47 
C. Some Implications of Conjoined Polarization 
Before examining how the coincidence of racial and partisan polarization 
affected redistricting and election administration specifically, we note some 
larger political implications. First, racial and partisan identities are both 
fraught with strong emotions. And given that there is also a gender divide in 
the mix,48 political emotions have upped the political intensity potential. A key 
element of any pluralist design is promoting flexible and crosscutting 
                                                                                                                     
 41 See Kathleen Ronayne & Emily Swanson, Young Voters from Newer Immigrant 
Families Lean More Liberal, Poll Shows, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 8, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/immigrant-young-voters-liberal/ [https://perma.cc/ 
S48A-KLLJ]. 
 42 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 179 (2d ed. 2012).  
 43 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 44 Davidson, supra note 12, at 21. 
 45 See Fleisher & Bond, supra note 36, at 432. 
 46 Id. at 431. 
 47 Frank Newport, Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White, GALLUP 
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-
mostly-white.aspx [https://perma.cc/PQ4H-KW89]. 
 48 Hilary Clinton’s historic candidacy puts gender front and center as an issue that 
divides the parties. See Danielle Kurtzleben, The Trump-Clinton Gender Gap Could Be the 
Largest in More than 60 Years, NPR (May 26, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/26/ 
479319725/the-trump-clinton-gender-gap-could-be-the-largest-in-more-than-60-years 
[https://perma.cc/Q86M-HSQW]. But certainly, even before her candidacy, gender issues 
divided strongly on partisan lines. See Fiorina & Abrams, supra note 21, at 568–69, 577–
78. 
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alliances, limiting to some extent possible hardened cleavages.49 Hardened 
factions make the essential job of negotiating, bargaining, and compromise 
more difficult. The layering of partisan and racial identity is a particularly bad 
sociology given America’s peculiar and fractionalized political system, as little 
gets done in a decentralized power structure without a willingness to deal with 
the other side.50 In other words, the fractured nature of American institutions 
magnifies the ills of conjoined polarization and renders political dysfunction 
more intractable. 
Second, heightened contestation under conjoined polarization is not 
limited to voting rights, although voting rights are especially vulnerable under 
conjoined polarization because the electoral process directly affects the 
parties’ access to power in the first place. Conjoined polarization has turned 
immigration policy into a proxy battle over political power. Immigration has 
always been a hotly contested issue in the United States,51 with clear 
implications for U.S. culture and the economy. But given the racial 
composition of contemporary partisan alignments, a more open and inclusive 
policy embracing undocumented immigrants and refugees threatens the long-
term viability of the Republican Party unless the Party either adapts its 
positions to attract more nonwhite voters (as recommended by the Party 
establishment’s post-mortem after its 2012 presidential defeat)52 or finds ways 
to restrict the volume of potentially unfavorable immigration (as vocalized by 
Donald Trump).53 
Immigration is also clearly linked to voting rights: anxiety about the one is 
tied to the other. As Latino voters develop a stronger Democratic partisan 
                                                                                                                     
 49 The classic articulation of pluralist design was from ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO 
GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 325 (2d ed. 2005), and of the 
non-dominance principle, from MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 17, 20 (1983). With respect to political reform, see generally 
BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 
(2015). The concern over hardened factions in politics goes back to the founding era. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) was centrally occupied with this problem. In it, 
Hamilton argued that if factions and their alliances shifted from issue to issue, factionalism 
would do less injury to the governance of the nation. See generally id. 
 50 Barber & McCarty, supra note 5, at 15. 
 51 Bipartisan efforts to reform immigration has failed over and over again; it has 
become a part of our recurring political history. See Rachel Weiner, How Immigration 
Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-
failed-over-and-over/ [https://perma.cc/E3XU-RR5L]. Part of the Obama administration’s 
efforts to reform immigration through executive action can be traced to its frustration with 
the legislative process’s ability to arrive at any compromise. Id. 
 52 Danny Vinik, Can the GOP Appeal to Minority Voters?, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/08/can-the-gop-appeal-to-minority-voters-
000209 [https://perma.cc/FE7F-LNM3]. 
 53 Stephen Collinson & Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Immigration: No Amnesty, No 
Pivot, CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/politics/donald-trump-
immigration-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U7UR-4YQ4]. 
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identity, immigration reforms pose more of an existential threat to 
Republicans. The inability to control U.S. borders strengthens the partisan 
motivation to reduce the naturalization rate and to strengthen ballot security 
even if the evidence of fraudulent voting is extremely thin and isolated.54 
The intersection of these two issues occurred in a near miss during the 
Supreme Court’s 2016 term in Evenwel v. Abbott.55 The case was about how 
states can calculate total population for the purposes of state and local 
legislative redistricting.56 First, some background: states have to draw their 
legislative districts under the one person, one vote principle established by the 
Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders:57 districts must contain equal numbers 
of people.58 This is also known as the equipopulous rule.59 Wesberry was 
decided against the backdrop of severe malapportionment. States often had 
districts containing disparate numbers of people, which meant that the votes of 
those in smaller districts had more chance of swaying an election, 
proportionally speaking, when compared to votes of those in a larger district.60 
After Wesberry, states apportioned districts of equal total population, using the 
decennial census.61 Some population deviation between the districts was 
permitted, but generally no more than 10% was allowed.62 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Justin Levitt, the current Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights 
Division, found only thirty-one credible instances of voter fraud out of one billion votes 
cast. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 
Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investig 
ation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/ 
[https://perma.cc/6H5X-44H8]. The article was published when he was a professor at 
Loyola Law School. For further discussion of the rarity of fraudulent voting, see LORRAINE 
C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 5–7 (2010), and David Schultz, Less Than 
Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great 
Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 494–501 (2008). Voter fraud is also 
highly unusual in in-person voting. Id. The vote fraud that occurs is primarily through vote-
by-mail. Id. 
 55 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1126–27 (2016) (holding that states and 
localities can use total population in drawing its legislative districts). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Response, The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional 
Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2005). 
 60 See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: 
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 30–31 (2008). 
 61 See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 (“But, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
jurisdictions have equalized total population, as measured by the decennial census. Today, 
all States use total-population numbers from the census when designing congressional and 
state-legislative districts, and only seven States adjust those census numbers in any 
meaningful way.”). 
 62 Id. (citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983)). 
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The plaintiffs’ challenge in Evenwel was in part a response to the 
sweeping demographic change caused by immigration.63 Due to high numbers 
of noncitizens, Texas districts’ total populations often do not match their total 
number of eligible voters (also known as the CVAP population, which stands 
for Citizen Voting Age Population).64 While containing equal numbers of 
people, Senate districts contained differing numbers of eligible voters.65 Urban 
districts that absorbed more immigrants contained fewer eligible voters than 
rural districts.66 The plaintiffs in Evenwel, who lived in one of the rural 
districts with more eligible voters, argued that their votes had been diluted.67 
Their theory was that under Wesberry, their votes counted for less than that of 
a similar vote in another district with fewer eligible voters.68 
The Evenwel plaintiffs’ challenge cannot be understood purely in terms of 
geography. Politics permeates the case: the challenge also reflects the political 
geography that conjoined polarization has created. The plaintiffs in Evenwel 
would not have brought the case if they were politically aligned with the 
voters of urban districts.69 Put simply, they were Republicans, and they only 
brought the case because the districts that contained fewer eligible voters (and 
more immigrants) were expected to vote for Democrats. Evenwel demonstrates 
aptly how the politics of voting, immigration, and geography are inextricably 
bound up together. By enlarging the numerator of how many persons must be 
                                                                                                                     
 63 See id. at 1124–25. 
 64 See Ryan Murphy, Updated Map: Not All Voting-Age Populations Are Equal, TEX. 
TRIB. (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/library/data/texas-legislative-cvap-
map/ [https://perma.cc/UL2J-N8B2]. Suffrage in the United States is limited to citizens. 
For a discussion of alien suffrage, see generally Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local 
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993). 
 65 See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1125. Race data from Texas Senate Districts sheds some 
light on this phenomenon. Plaintiffs reside in Senate Districts 1 and 4, with Hispanic 
percentages of 10.5 and 16.5 respectively. District Population Analysis with County 
Subtotals: Senate District 1 – PlanS172, TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, http://www.fyi.legis.state 
.tx.us/fyiwebdocs/PDF/senate/dist1/r4.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8M8-X8K6] (last modified Jan. 
13, 2015); District Population Analysis with County Subtotals: Senate District 4 – 
PlanS172, TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/fyiwebdocs/PDF/senate 
/dist4/r4.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA3A-JDRB] (last modified Jan. 13, 2015). District 6, 
containing the county that Houston is in, is 73.8% Hispanic. District Population Analysis 
with County Subtotals: Senate District 6 – PlanS172, TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, 
http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/fyiwebdocs/PDF/senate/dist6/r4.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ8N-
8DRR] (last modified Jan. 13, 2015). 
 66 Senate Districts 1 and 4 are comparatively rural. State Senate Districts: 84th 
Legislature 2015-2016, TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us 
/redist/pdf/senate/map.pdf [https://perma.cc/US45-9UK3] (locations of Districts 1 and 4); 
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000: Texas Profile, REDCROSS.ORG, http://maps.redcross.org/ 
website/Maps/Images/Texas/TX_Census2K_Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZB6-GVY8] 
(population density of the two districts). 
 67 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1125. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. at 1123, 1125. 
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in a district, immigration poses an attenuated, but nevertheless causal threat to 
Republican control of populous states like Texas. Conjoined polarization 
renders the political consequences of demographic changes highly predictable. 
How many immigrants come and where they end up settling become not only 
policy questions that the parties must grapple with but also alter the political 
calculus that the parties make in their battles for power.  
One final associated general trend is the decreasing influence of traditional 
media and the rising prominence of social media.70 While the long-term 
effects of this trend will only fully reveal themselves in time, it seems pretty 
clear at this point that it has removed a filter on public dialogue, and under the 
cover of semi-anonymous internet identities, unleashed and provided a wide 
platform to uncivil discourse, and in some cases, hateful and violent speech.71 
Social media may also contribute to a phenomenon that social scientists have 
termed affective polarization.72 Social media platforms like Facebook or 
Twitter, which allow users to choose whom to receive news and entertainment 
from, may cause users to become cloistered within a particular ideological 
community.73 It may also create greater pressures to conform to prevailing 
views in the online communities.74 The Internet seems also to give rapid 
national and international exposure to what might have been in an earlier era a 
localized partisan and racial issue like minority voting rights. The segregated 
and segmented media environment threatens to calcify conjoined polarization. 
III. CONJOINED POLARIZATION AND VOTING RIGHTS 
How has conjoined polarization affected voting rights? In 1965, voting 
rights advocacy had a geographic and racial focus in the South and on African-
Americans.75 Dealmaking on civil rights legislation, difficult to be sure, was at 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, State of the News Media 2016, PEW RES. CTR. 
(June 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/state-of-the-news-media-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/FKN2-38GP]. 
 71 See, e.g., Katherine Long & Coral Garnick, WWU Cancels Classes Tuesday After 
Racial Threats on Social Media, SEATTLE TIMES, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/education/western-washington-university-cancels-classes-as-hate-speech-is-
investigated/ [https://perma.cc/L97P-WVT8] (last updated Dec. 7, 2015) (discussing hate 
speech facilitated by social media). 
 72 See, e.g., Yphtach Lelkes et al., The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to 
Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect, AM. J. POL. SCI. 13 (2015), 
https://pcl.stanford.edu/research/2016/lelkes-ajps-hostile-audience.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X8B-
PG93]. 
 73 See Cass R. Sunstein, How Facebook Makes Us Dumber, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Jan. 8, 
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-08/how-facebook-makes-us-
dumber [https://perma.cc/QEX8-4NPX] (discussing confirmation bias on social media). 
 74 See Lelkes et al., supra note 72, at 13. 
 75 The coverage formula under section 4 had a decidedly Southern focus. See 
Davidson, supra note 12, at 30–31. Gains in African-American voter registration were 
made primarily in the South. See id. at 29–30, 36. Certainly the Voting Rights Act’s 
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least more viable than it is today because it centered on a specific region and 
was widely regarded as exceptional. With current voting rights controversies 
spread across the country, deals between the two parties are harder to reach.  
Before delving into the details of how redistricting and election 
administration are affected by conjoined polarization, we note that the 
transformation of voting rights from a circumscribed, regional problem into a 
contentious, national one renders the challenges we describe more 
insurmountable. As a rule of thumb in politics, the wider the scope of 
potentially affected interests, the larger the opposition coalition and the more 
difficult it will be to achieve a broad consensus.76 Contemporary voting rights 
issues cover a wider spectrum of minority groups and have potential 
consequences for partisan power across the country. Whether or not today’s 
members of Congress and politicians generally are as able as those in the past, 
they are operating in a more complex environment.  
A. Redistricting 
1. The Protections for Minority Voting Rights Under the Voting Rights 
Act 
The Voting Rights Act helped minorities achieve an unprecedented level 
of representation in a relatively short period of time.77 These achievements 
were possible thanks to two crucial components of the Act: section 2 and 
section 5. Section 2 provided the affirmative litigation tool to create new 
majority-minority districts,78 and section 5 provided the preclearance backstop 
to secure those districts.79  
Section 2 provided the doctrinal handle for challenging voting practices 
and arrangements that prevented minorities from electing their representatives 
of choice. Most cases involved challenges to at-large election schemes that 
often made it impossible for minorities, mostly African-Americans, to elect 
their representatives of choice.80 It became, over time, a powerful instrument 
for affirmatively advancing minority representation. But this was not always 
the case. Before 1982, courts interpreted section 2 to impose an intent 
requirement for discriminating against minorities before redistricting plans 
                                                                                                                     
protections were not limited to African-Americans, but the history of the Voting Rights Act 
and the advocacy for African-American voting rights are intertwined. See id. at 30.  
 76 The formalization of this insight is the size principle. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE 
THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 126–27 (1962). 
 77 Davidson, supra note 12, at 26–27. 
 78 See 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (Supp. II 2014) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437). 
 79 See id. § 10302 (originally enacted as § 5, 79 Stat. at 439). 
 80 The basis for such litigation is discussed in Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, 
At-Large Elections and Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical 
and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL. 982, 984 (1981). 
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could be struck down.81 The 1982 amendment eliminated the intent 
requirement and explicitly implemented an effects standard.82 The Court in 
Thornburg v. Gingles then laid out a simplified three-part test for determining 
when a political jurisdiction had to remedy a situation of minority under-
representation.83 
Section 5, while no less significant, played a more defensive role. The 
preclearance regime was, by definition, put into place in order to prevent 
backsliding in minority representation.84 In places with a long history of racial 
discrimination and exclusion, section 5 played a major role in preventing 
reversion to entrenched discriminatory methods and practices.85 Section 2 and 
section 5 worked in tandem: section 2 allowed minorities to secure gains in 
representation,86 and section 5 allowed them to hold on to those gains through 
the non-retrogression standard.87 
Yet as minority gains grew, the scope of both section 2 and section 5 
became increasingly limited. Section 2’s ability to create new minority ability-
to-elect districts was hamstrung by the Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno88 and 
its progeny.89 In the Shaw line of cases, the Court held that while race may be 
taken into account in drawing districts, and indeed must be taken into 
consideration under the Voting Rights Act, excessive consideration of race in 
                                                                                                                     
 81 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). For more background on 
section 2, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–46 (1986). 
 82 Section 2 now protects against:  
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the 
ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, to elect 
their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote . . . . 
52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (emphasis added) (as amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134). 
 83 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51. Under the Gingles test, the minority must prove that (1) 
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district, (2) it is politically cohesive, and (3) racial-bloc voting usually defeats the 
minority’s preferred candidate. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
618 (3d ed. 2007). 
 84 About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/AKR7-HR7Z] (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2015) [hereinafter About Section 5]. 
 85 See, e.g., infra notes 139 and 164. 
 86 See U.S.C. § 10304. 
 87 See id. § 10302; see also About Section 5, supra note 84. 
 88 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). 
 89 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553–54 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 
916–17 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1000 (1994). For a modern case along this line of cases, but with a different 
outcome, see Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC), 135 S. Ct. 1257, 
1287–88 (2015), and also id. at 1287–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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redistricting triggered strict scrutiny.90 Other traditional redistricting criteria, 
such as compactness and communities of interest, must also be taken into 
account.91 And section 5’s role was strictly limited to a retrogression standard, 
and could not be used, like section 2, to affirmatively create majority-minority 
seats.92 
The new legal restraints plus the earlier achievements in African-
American representation meant that by the 2001 round of redistricting, most of 
the new minority ability-to-elect opportunities were situated in areas that had 
experienced high rates of immigration, naturalization, and fertility—i.e. 
primarily Latino, and to a lesser extent Asian-American neighborhoods.93 
Immigrant demography had some indirect benefits for African-American 
representation.94 Even though the African-American population share was 
declining nationally over this period, African-American incumbents in cities 
like Los Angeles were able to hold onto their seats longer than might be 
expected because the remaining African-American populations in their 
districts had a higher proportion of voters than the Latino communities in their 
districts did.95 Moreover, African-Americans and Latinos shared an allegiance 
to the Democratic Party.96  
The Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder97 could have serious 
consequences for the 2020 redistricting cycle. By striking down section 4 of 
the Voting Rights Act, which established a coverage formula for parts of the 
country that would be subject to the preclearance process, it essentially 
neutered section 5.98 The 2021 round of redistricting will be the first in recent 
history without section 5 preclearance protection. Section 5 was a strong 
regulatory tool for two reasons. First, the retrogression standard clearly put the 
burden on the line drawers to draw and justify no fewer than the existing 
                                                                                                                     
 90 See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. 
 91 Id. at 646. The traditional redistricting principles are compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions. Id. at 647. 
 92 The Supreme Court also eroded some of section 5’s enforcement power. For 
instance, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000), the Court held 
that the Voting Rights Act did not prohibit preclearing a redistricting plan that was enacted 
with a discriminatory purpose, but with non-retrogressive effects.  
 93 See WILSON, supra note 42, at 179 (discussing the “new immigrant” migration of 
Asian- and Latin-American immigrants and their gravitation toward urban centers). 
 94 See Karen M. Kaufmann, Black and Latino Voters in Denver: Responses to Each 
Other’s Political Leadership, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 107, 119–20 (2003) (discussing the voting 
habits of Latino and African-American voters in Denver and other major cities throughout 
the 1990s). 
 95 Id. at 120. 
 96 This was evident in the large differential in the Hispanic vote share between 
President Obama and John McCain. See MARK HUGO LOPEZ & SUSAN MINUSHKIN, PEW 
HISPANIC CTR., 2008 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANIC VOTER ATTITUDES ii (July 
2008), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/90.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HMM-GQXB]. 
 97 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 98 See id. at 2627, 2631; see also id at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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number of minority ability-to-elect districts.99 This meant that unless the 
minority population dropped drastically, it would not lose seats over time.  
But secondly, and perhaps more powerfully, the Department of Justice’s 
functional analysis brought a number of additional factors to bear on the task 
beyond sheer population statistics—i.e. extensive voting statistics, historical 
background, events leading up to the redistricting, departures from normal 
procedures, and legislative and administrative history.100 This created 
enormous uncertainty and risk aversion about whether the Department of 
Justice or the D.C. Circuit Court101 would approve of any given plan. If not, a 
covered jurisdiction would be forced to produce a timely replacement plan or 
to use a court-ordered plan. 
2. Remaining Doctrinal Tools for Protecting Minority Voting Rights 
Against Partisan Gerrymandering 
The invalidation of section 5’s enforcement power puts more of the burden 
for protecting minority representation from an adverse redistricting plan on 
section 2 and the relevant constitutional amendments. The uncertainty over 
their effectiveness will affect both the incentives of legislatures when drawing 
maps and the remedial tools available to litigants who seek to challenge them.  
The thinning legal protection of voting rights coincides with increasing 
political polarization, which raises the stakes for more partisan 
gerrymandering where the local political conditions permit (i.e., unified 
control of the redistricting process).102 Partisan gerrymandering will not be 
new to the 2020 redistricting cycle. Prior to the 2011 redistricting cycle, 
Republicans rode a national wave of support in 2010 to gain control of the 
redistricting process in twenty states.103 They were therefore able to make 
gains in the state legislatures and Congress through redistricting that had been 
                                                                                                                     
 99 See About Section 5, supra note 84. 
 100 See generally Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act; Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 7470 (Feb. 9, 2011) (summarizing the Attorney General’s 
delegation of authority for determinations under section 5 in light of recent legislation and 
judicial decisions, and providing guidance concerning the review of redistricting plans 
submitted to the Attorney General). 
 101 Instead of going through preclearance by the Department of Justice, jurisdictions 
had the option of obtaining a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the District 
of Columbia District Court. Id. at 7470. 
 102 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 103 Based on the way that the NCSL calculates state control, nine state governments 
were controlled by Republicans before the 2010 election. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, 2010 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN COMPOSITION PRIOR TO THE 
ELECTION (Nov. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2010_Legis_and_State_pre.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9H5B-4P7L]. After the election in 2010, the number rose to twenty. NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN 
COMPOSITION (Jan. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2010_Legis_and_State 
_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYP5-WBZC]. 
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denied to them in earlier decades when the Democrats controlled more state 
legislatures and governorships.104 A plan with Republican bias can increase 
the Party’s seat share by efficiently clustering Republican voters just enough 
to win but not so much as to waste Republican votes. At the same time, the 
strategy would aim to either concentrate or fracture Democratic voters.105 The 
tactic of packing minority voters is facilitated by the inherent residential 
clustering of minorities in ghettos, barrios, and minority neighborhoods.106 
In some of these instances of partisan gerrymandering, the Voting Rights 
Act was employed as an excuse to pack minority voters. There may be no need 
for a majority-minority district if liberal whites or other minority groups 
demonstrate a willingness to vote for a minority candidate of choice. In some 
states, packing minorities into existing majority-minority districts diverted 
them away from competitive districts, as was the case in Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC).107 In that case, the Republican legislature 
had packed African-American voters into existing majority-minority districts, 
and cited two legitimate rationales to justify its 2012 plan: first, to limit district 
population deviations as mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reynolds v. Sims,108 and second, to avoid retrogression under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act.109 But packing African-Americans to prevent retrogression 
was clearly unnecessary. Prior to the 2012 redistricting plan, many of the 
majority-minority Alabama districts were already heavily concentrated—for 
instance, 72.75% of District 26’s population was African-American.110 
The use of the non-retrogression standard as a pretext to pack minority 
voters also occurred in Virginia in Wittman v. Personhuballah.111 The Virginia 
Legislature packed minority voters in the already heavily majority-minority 
District 3, represented by Bobby Scott.112 It claimed that the reason it did so 
                                                                                                                     
 104 Carl Klarner, Forecasting Control of State Governments and Redistricting 
Authority After the 2010 Elections, 8 FORUM, Oct. 2010, at 20–21. The Republican plan 
was known as “Operation REDMAP.” Republican State Leadership Comm., 2012 
REDMAP Summary Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/?p=646 [https://perma.cc/J6JK-SPNS]. 
 105 For a description of how a partisan plan works, see Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the 
Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 320, 331 (1985). 
 106 Bruce E. Cain et al., Sorting or Self-Sorting: Competition and Redistricting in 
California?, in THE NEW POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CALIFORNIA 245, 245 (Frédérick 
Douzet et al. eds., 2008); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: 
Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 241 (2013). 
 107 Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC), 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1282 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 108 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–69 (1964) (holding that state legislative 
districts had to be equipopulous). 
 109 ALBC, 135 S. Ct. at 1263. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2016), dismissing appeal from 
Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 
2015). The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at 1734.  
 112 Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *17. 
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was to ensure compliance with the non-retrogression standard of the Voting 
Rights Act even though there was no evidence Representative Scott was ever 
in danger of losing his seat given his support among the liberal white 
community as well.113 
a. Shaw and Progeny 
Redistricting plans that aim for partisan advantage by dividing the 
population based on race may be challengeable under the Shaw line of cases. 
Indeed, that is what the Court used to strike down the redistricting plans in 
both Alabama and Virginia: it found that the plans focused too much on the 
race of the inhabitants when drawing districts.114 Yet conjoined polarization 
will reduce the effectiveness of racial gerrymandering doctrine. 
The Court has expressed deep reluctance to hear partisan gerrymandering 
claims.115 In attempting to prevent the courts from entering the political 
thicket, the Court has implanted a partisan exception under the Shaw line of 
cases. In Easley v. Cromartie,116 the Court held that courts must be satisfied 
that race, rather than party, was the dominant explanation for district lines 
before the redistricting plan can be struck down as a racial gerrymander.117 
This requirement likely encompasses so few redistricting scenarios as to 
almost entirely neutralize any effect that the racial gerrymandering doctrine 
might have. 
Such a distinction between race and party is meaningless in the context of 
conjoined polarization. Nearly every decision to discriminate against racial 
minorities in voting has an electoral purpose. Considered in that light, all 
manipulations of the electoral process are at heart partisan. But since direct 
evidence of motive is almost never available in redistricting, courts have to 
rely on line drawers’ conduct in inferring their motivation. The gerrymanders 
in ALBC and Wittman were easy to strike down because they were 
unsophisticated and ham-handed: the legislatures simply looked at the race of 
the inhabitant and decided which district the inhabitant should be in.118 
Presuming one’s politics based on one’s race is prima facie racial stereotyping 
precluded by the Constitution.119 
                                                                                                                     
 113 Id. 
 114 ALBC, 135 S. Ct. at 1270–72 (finding that race could have predominated in the 
drawing of district lines); see also Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *13–15. 
 115 The Court opened the door to hearing partisan gerrymandering claims in Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986), but in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004), it 
failed to coalesce around a workable standard to measure unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymanders.  
 116 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See ALBC, 135 S. Ct. at 1270–72; Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *19. 
 119 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996). 
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Future racial gerrymanders may not be as easily challenged as in ALBC 
and in Wittman for several reasons. First, racial gerrymandering doctrine is 
inherently uncertain, with ill-defined upper and lower constraints. There is a 
danger in doing either too much or too little for minority representation. When 
the Voting Rights Act was intact, line drawers were authorized, and indeed in 
some situations required, to take race into consideration in drawing district 
lines. Now that section 4 has been voided, it is uncertain how much line 
drawers will be allowed to take race into account.120 And it is unclear whether 
anything short of using race data, and race data alone, will run afoul of the 
Court’s test for racial gerrymanders. 
Second, the emphasis that the Shaw line of cases puts on the appearance of 
a gerrymandered district may also hamper the doctrine’s ability to adjudicate 
future racial gerrymanders produced in the context of conjoined polarization. 
In striking down the racially gerrymandered districts in Shaw, the Court 
discussed their uncouth shapes: one resembling a “Rorschach ink-blot test,” 
and the other winding like a snake.121 And it held, explicitly, that the 
appearance and shape of a district are relevant factors to consider in racial 
gerrymandering cases.122 The emphasis on the appearance of racial 
gerrymanders may make sense in states where minorities are spread out 
spatially across the state. In those circumstances, legislatures have to draw 
contorted district lines in order to capture minorities in a single district.123 
But a racial gerrymander certainly can be accomplished without drawing 
hideous or misshapen districts. Especially in places where minorities are 
residentially clustered,124 racial gerrymanders may be accomplished by 
creating compact and contiguous districts. The shape of the district is therefore 
a red herring in these cases. As in other areas of life, appearances may blind 
observers to other forces at play. While the irregular shape of a district may 
give judges reason for suspicion of a redistricting plan, it must not be a 
necessary element of a racial gerrymander claim. 
Third, conjoined polarization makes it easy for line drawers to avoid using 
race data in the future. Conjoined polarization allowed Republicans in 
Alabama and Virginia to redistrict based on race and achieve a partisan 
outcome.125 Legislators may in the future achieve the same racial ends simply 
                                                                                                                     
 120 Certainly, race must still be taken into account under section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-
2-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/6F4J-T865] (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
 121 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993) (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 
476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 122 Id. at 647 (“Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter.”). Racial gerrymandering cases routinely look to the shape of the 
district as circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *10–13. 
 123 This is what happened in Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633–34. 
 124 See Chen & Rodden, supra note 106, at 241; see also Cain et al., supra note 106, at 
245. 
 125 See Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *10 (“Defendants and the dissent are inarguably 
correct that partisan political considerations, as well as a desire to protect incumbents, 
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by looking at partisan data: African-Americans and Latinos are distinctively 
more Democratic than whites and Asian-Americans.126 The partisan cue 
effectively serves the purpose of the racial cue. In the context of conjoined 
polarization, race and politics are mirror images of each other and can be used 
interchangeably for redistricting. 
Fourth, adapting to the Court’s decisions in ALBC and Wittman, 
Republican legislatures may also employ other pretexts to achieve their 
partisan goals. For instance, some racial gerrymanders may be justified by 
arguing that there is no guarantee that minorities will have an ability to elect 
unless the minority population achieves a majority or even supermajority share 
of the electorate, an assertion that can only be disproven with a careful 
analysis of prior voting patterns. In order to determine the minority population 
required to prevent retrogression under preclearance, jurisdictions had the 
burden of conducting these kinds of voting analyses (requiring extensive data 
collection) to be submitted to the Department of Justice under preclearance 
guidelines.127 Without such a requirement, legislatures in the future may 
argue, with little or no data, that a district must be packed in order to guarantee 
minorities the ability to elect. Their argument is a variation on the theme of 
“what you don’t know can’t hurt you”: if a voting analysis is never conducted, 
then the line drawers would have no reason to know how many votes are 
needed to maintain ability-to-elect districts.128 
Even if the Voting Rights Act fades out as a plausible pretext for packing 
African-American voters, there are other ways to legitimize packing. For 
instance, packed districts may appear to fit compactness or communities of 
interest criteria that many states and local jurisdictions have adopted in recent 
years. Because these criteria are not overtly racial, they may effectively 
preclude a racial gerrymandering challenge. 
When Democrats solely control the redistricting process, the logic 
reverses, creating a different path to retrogression. The Democratic strategy for 
increasing the Party’s seat share is to crack—i.e. divide up and pair highly 
loyal Democratic African-American or Latino voters with white voters in 
order to achieve efficiently winnable seats.129 This was, of course, the initial 
                                                                                                                     
played a role in drawing district lines.”); see also Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama (ALBC), 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1266–67 (2015). 
 126 See generally Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Amazing Race: How 
Post-Racial Was Obama’s Victory?, BOSTON REV. (Jan./Feb. 2009), http://bostonreview.net/ 
archives/BR34.1/ansolabehere_stewart.php [https://perma.cc/3YFE-35XD]. 
 127 Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 232–34 (2003). 
 128 Indeed in Wittman v. Personhuballah, the legislature adopted this exact same 
strategy: it failed to conduct a racial bloc voting analysis to determine just how many 
minorities would have to be in the Third District for it to continue to be a minority ability-
to-elect district. Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *4. 
 129 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2007) (mem.), is such an example. For a discussion of 
the case, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial 
Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 564–65 (2004). 
2016] CONJOINED POLARIZATION 889 
redistricting problem the Voting Rights Act had to solve when the Democrats 
controlled most state legislatures, and white Democratic incumbents 
represented minority constituents in the 1960s and 1970s.130 Since neither 
maximizing minority representation nor proportional representation are 
required by the Voting Rights Act, the door would be theoretically open to 
creating more coalitional seats in section 5 jurisdictions when conditions of 
polarization or exclusion do not justify such a decision. Under pressure to 
compete for Congressional or state legislative seats, Democrats could fail in 
their duty to provide equal opportunities for previously excluded minorities to 
elect candidates of choice.  
b. The Erosion of Section 2 Protections in Redistricting 
The demise of section 5, the unreliability of the Shaw line of cases, and the 
nonexistence of a partisan gerrymandering doctrine all shift the redistricting 
enforcement burden onto section 2. Despite Shelby County, efforts to diminish 
minority representation by fracturing reasonably compact minority 
neighborhoods where there is evidence of white majority polarization certainly 
still violate section 2.131 But the conjoining of party, ideology, and race 
complicates the standard section 2 tests for polarization—first because the 
Gingles tests were predicated on detecting racial divisions within the 
Democratic Party, and second, because the increased intermingling of minority 
communities in many areas of the country complicates all three parts of the 
Gingles test. 
When the Voting Rights Act was passed, the predominant racial problem 
was the prejudice and domination of white conservative Democrats; at that 
time, partisanship could be held constant and racial effects could be more 
cleanly measured by examining elections that pitted African-American or 
Latino candidates against white candidates in Democratic primaries or 
nonpartisan contests.132 But since white social conservatives have become 
Republican, polarization is most evident in November races, which makes it 
hard to distinguish racial animus from normal partisan loyalty. Will typical 
November partisan voting patterns demonstrate enough racial polarization to 
justify a section 2 obligation to draw additional minority ability-to-elect 
districts? Or will the Court require a more refined analysis comparing, say, 
                                                                                                                     
 130 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 131 Section 2’s utility was clearly demonstrated in Ellen Katz et al., Documenting 
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 
1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006). 
 132 See, e.g., Bernard Grofman et al., The “Totality of the Circumstances Test” in 
Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective, 7 
LAW & POL’Y 199, 209, 210 tbl.1 (1985) (describing vote shares in primary elections); 
Peyton McCrary, Racially Polarized Voting in the South: Quantitative Evidence from the 
Courtroom, 14 SOC. SCI. HIST. 507, 517–20 (1990) (same). 
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November polarization levels given white liberal candidates (e.g., John Kerry 
in 2004) as opposed to liberal minority candidates (e.g., Obama)? 
Conjoined polarization renders futile any attempt under section 2 to 
distinguish between race and politics. Theoretically, the intermingling of race 
and politics ought not matter under section 2. A section 2 violation can be 
established based only on racially disparate results, without racially 
discriminatory intent.133 Therefore, courts are not meant to enquire whether 
race, rather than politics, was the reason for district lines that dilute minority 
voting strength.134 Doctrinally, it is sufficient that those district lines do in fact 
dilute minority voting strength. But LULAC v. Clements135 puts this simple 
correlation requirement in jeopardy.136 If section 2’s prohibition against vote 
dilutions of minorities becomes interchangeable with a prohibition against 
vote dilutions of Democrats, it will face strong resistance from the federal 
judiciary. 
Another challenge for section 2 will be the ever-increasing intermingling 
of minority populations. From the start, the Court has set a high bar for 
coalitional claims under section 2. Bartlett v. Strickland removed any 
obligation to create coalitional seats under the Voting Rights Act.137 Even with 
the most favorable of the first prong—50% of the population as opposed to 
Voting Age Population or Citizen Voting Age Population—more urban areas 
in particular will be unprotected from partisan efforts to create packed 
minority seats.138 
Much of what is certain about the 2020 round of redistricting is political. 
Surely, the parties will ruthlessly redistrict in search of any partisan advantage. 
What is uncertain is legal. Conjoined polarization undermines the ability of the 
racial gerrymandering doctrine to keep gerrymanders in check. And when 
combined with demographic change, conjoined polarization compels an 
updating of section 2 doctrinal tools if they are to be effective in securing 
minority voting rights. This combination of certainty and uncertainty is toxic: 
even risk-averse legislatures may gerrymander first and fight any legal 
challenges later. In the next Part, we discuss the threats to minority voting 
rights through election administration given conjoined polarization. The same 
                                                                                                                     
 133 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (Supp. II 2014). 
 134 See id. This is very different from the Court’s racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, 
where much of the focus of the Court’s inquiry is whether race, rather than politics, 
dominated the drawing of the district lines. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).  
 135 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc). 
 136 Id. at 863 (“Electoral losses that are attributable to partisan politics do not implicate 
the protections of § 2.”); see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote 
Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2010). 
 137 Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (observing that crossover districts 
cannot meet the first prong under Gingles for the minority group to be sufficiently large 
and geographically compact enough to constitute a majority in a single-member district). 
 138 See id. at 26–27 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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theme resonates: partisan incentives to manipulate the electoral process to the 
detriment of minority voting rights are clear and certain, whereas the legal 
remedies to address them are in flux. 
B. Election Administration 
It is more than a little ironic that voter qualifications and electoral 
procedures have re-emerged as voting rights controversies. The initial 
rationale for passing the Voting Rights Act was to address the discriminatory 
practices that prevented large numbers of African-Americans in the South 
from registering and voting.139 The bipartisan consensus against these 
practices was so substantial in 1964 that it was possible to pass the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment140 prohibiting poll taxes despite the politically complex 
supermajority and multilevel approval process required to amend the U.S. 
Constitution.141 One wonders whether the Twenty-Fourth Amendment would 
pass in the current highly polarized environment. And there is virtually no 
prospect at the moment for a new amendment that would prevent modern 
efforts to manipulate election processes for political advantage. 
In the early 1960s, Southern Democrats used intimidation and onerous 
voter qualifications, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, to severely depress 
African-American participation and thereby maintain white political 
dominance.142 In the 1960s, moderate and liberal Republicans could support 
voting rights legislation to end these practices without harming their political 
prospects, since the South was then beyond their political reach. 
                                                                                                                     
 139 For instance, the Voting Rights Act suspended literacy tests nationwide. See 
Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the 
Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007). It also authorized the appointment of 
federal registrars and examiners to supervise minority voter registration and voting. Id. 
 140 “The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election 
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator 
or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 141 The House passed the 24th Amendment 295 to 86. Historical Highlights: The 24th 
Amendment, August 27, 1962, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/Histor 
icalHighlight/Detail/37045 [https://perma.cc/3A44-ANR4]. A majority of states have also 
ratified the amendment. An Overview of the 24th Amendment, LAWS, 
http://constitution.laws.com/24th-amendment [https://perma.cc/7HNS-HVGF]. 
 142 One of the most notorious of such institutions was the White Primary. It took four 
Supreme Court decisions to strike it down: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932); 
and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927). The cases challenged Texas’s exclusion 
of African-Americans from voting in the Democratic primary. Since it was a one party 
state, the primary was where voters could exercise meaningful choice over who their 
representatives would be. See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 463. 
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1. Changes to Election Administration Under Conjoined Polarization 
With conjoined polarization, things have changed. Contemporary 
measures such as voter identification laws, restrictions on early voting 
opportunities, selective precinct consolidations, aggressive voter purges, voter 
caging, and the like, create additional bureaucratic requirements in the name of 
ballot security that disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups and 
minorities.143 Given that these groups are on average more likely to support 
Democratic rather than Republican candidates, many believe that these 
measures are primarily intended to help Republican candidates by suppressing 
minority turnout.144 The evidence that they do is mixed to date. It is clear, for 
example, that higher numbers of disadvantaged groups and minorities lack 
photo identification,145 but there is no firm proof at the moment that these 
tactics actually have produced a measurable electoral advantage.146 
The voter ID laws have attracted considerable media attention, but they are 
not the only modern barriers to voting. Such barriers are imposed not only by 
adding, but also by subtracting, means of voting that voters have come to rely 
on. Early voting—casting ballots before Election Day—is a good example. 
When early voting was first introduced in the late 1990s, it seemed to facilitate 
voting for older, white voters, who faced constraints in voting on Election 
Day.147 But the second-generation expansion of early voting in many states, 
                                                                                                                     
 143 The New Face of Jim Crow: Voter Suppression in America, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY, 
http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/files/TheNewFaceOfJimCrow.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT9Y-
3MXP].  
 144 The North Carolina law (commonly referred to as “SL 2013–381”) that imposed 
voter ID restrictions, retracted early voting opportunities, same day registration, etc., was 
passed by the general assembly by “strict party-line votes.” N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. 
McCrory, 831 F. 3d 204, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2016), motion to stay denied, No. 16A168, 2016 
WL 4535259 (S. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (mem.). The Texas voter ID law was passed by a 
Republican majority in both the house and the senate. Indeed, Republican control in Texas 
was crucial not only in passing the law, but in passing it in an expedited fashion. Veasey v. 
Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 646–53 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and 
rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 145 See, e.g., Declaration of Stephen D. Ansolabehere at 6, Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 
(No. 2:13-cv-193), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Veasey6552.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VVV8-NR9R] (finding that Hispanics and African-Americans were up to 
two and three times, respectively, more likely than whites to lack ID required to vote under 
Texas’s voter ID law). 
 146 Looking across the various studies, the evidence is mixed. See generally U.S GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO STATE VOTER 
IDENTIFICATION LAWS (Sept. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NJ5-B2FR]. 
 147 One study found early voters to be strong partisans, more likely to report an interest 
in politics, older, more conservative, more likely to be male, and more likely to be poor. 
Robert M. Stein, Early Voting, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 57, 61 (1998). Notably, it did not 
observe any differences in race, ethnicity or education levels between early voters and 
Election Day voters. Id. 
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including North Carolina and Ohio, has been embraced by the minority 
population.148 Early voting did not merely expand the number of days that 
registered voters could vote; it often allowed voters to vote in the evenings and 
on weekends, and in some cases, allowed them to register to vote and vote on 
the same day (a practice known as same-day registration).149 For various 
reasons, minority populations have benefited disproportionately from the 
flexibility that early voting and same-day registration offers.150 During the 
2012 General Election in North Carolina, over 70% of African-Americans 
who cast ballots did so through early voting, compared to 51% of white 
voters.151 And in some places, early voting allows minority organizing groups 
to vote as part of a tradition of “Souls to the Polls.”152 
A couple of states, after having offered early voting for almost a decade, 
retracted these measures.153 Their actions can only be understood in the 
context of conjoined polarization: the seemingly bureaucratic decision of 
whether to offer a method of voting conceals a philosophical fight about who 
should vote. It is no coincidence that early voting opportunities have been 
taken away by uniformly Republican governors, legislatures, and Secretaries 
of State.154 
Other seemingly mundane decisions about election administration are at 
heart also political. The closing of a polling station, for instance, might be a 
routine, administrative act that election administrators take in response to 
                                                                                                                     
 148 Sarah Smith, Which Voters Show Up When States Allow Early Voting?, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/which-voters-show-up-
when-states-allow-early-voting [https://perma.cc/3FUV-WCKM]. 
 149 This is still true today. Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-
day-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ZVA-9UHN]; State Laws Governing Early Voting, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 26, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx [https://perma.cc/HZT3-RQWM]. 
 150 See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in 
Florida in the Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331, 341 (2012). 
 151 Expert Report & Declaration of Paul Gronke at 26, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP 
v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-660), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/League1551.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7P-
BMQT]. 
 152 This was a tradition started by the NAACP. For more history, see Herron & Smith, 
supra note 150, at 332 n.3. 
 153 This was the impetus for litigation in Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 
768 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 1, 2014), and League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 
224, 234 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 154 In Ohio, early voting was retracted pursuant to a directive by Republican Secretary 
of State John Husted and a bill passed by the general assembly. Ohio State Conf., 768 F.3d 
at 531–32. And in North Carolina, it was retracted by a Republican led legislature. N.C. 
State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 218 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that the 
voter ID law and other provisions were ratified by “strict party-line votes”), motion to stay 
denied, No. 16A168, 2016 WL 4535259 (S. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (mem.). 
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declining populations in certain areas. But it might also be undertaken in order 
to make it harder for those who live in those areas to vote. In places with high 
levels of residential segregation, such tactics can discourage a political or 
racial group from voting. Conjoined polarization politicizes administrative 
decisions, and the effects that any election administration change might have 
on voters cannot be evaluated without a holistic understanding of the context 
in which the changes are implemented. Such context was available to the 
Department of Justice lawyers as they evaluated changes in election 
administration under the preclearance regime, but now that jurisdictions no 
longer have to justify any changes they make, citizens can only rely on 
uncertain and costly litigation to reverse any consequential and discriminatory 
burdens the state imposes on their franchise. 
2. Conjoined Polarization and the American Electoral System 
The potential for a renewed battle over restrictive voter qualifications is 
baked into the unique features of American election administration. Despite 
the professionalization and bureaucratization of election administration during 
the Progressive Era, the American system continues to retain several features 
that make it highly vulnerable to political manipulation. These include the 
constitutional allocation of the time, place, and manner of election to the 
states.155 The invocation of the Equal Protection Clause in Bush v. Gore156 to 
stop the Florida count because the state lacked a uniform recount standard157 
gave rise to some speculation that the Clause might play a larger role in 
policing election administration. But as many commentators have noted, the 
Court explicitly disclaimed the decision’s precedential value, realizing that 
applying the Equal Protection principle to ballot procedures across the board 
would substantially disrupt the American electoral system and threaten state 
sovereignty.158  
Layered on top of a system that allows considerable variation in how 
national elections are administered, the United States allows partisan officials 
to run the elections in many states and localities. As a consequence, we have 
seen in election disputes in Ohio, Florida, and Minnesota that decisions by 
Secretaries of State about whether to interpret the law loosely or strictly can 
                                                                                                                     
 155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 156 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000). 
 157 Votes were counted in inconsistent manners in the different counties—a vote cast 
in a certain county might not have qualified as a viable ballot in another. Id. at 106. 
 158 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law 
in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386–92 (2001). The Court in Bush v. Gore itself 
suggested that the decision might be sui generis. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (“Our consideration 
is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election 
processes generally presents many complexities.”). 
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swing the balance in a tight election.159 Even when partisan officials arguably 
attempt to be fair-minded, the perception of bias is strong. Such disputes may 
be intra-governmental: when the state legislature and the state generally is 
Democratic, but the Secretary of State is a Republican, there can be vicious 
divides within the state on how elections are administered. Other countries use 
neutral civil servants to administer elections.160 The United States entrusts the 
economy to an unelected body of experts at the Federal Reserve Bank, but by 
contrast, hands the responsibility for administering elections to party 
loyalists.161 
American politics is also highly professionalized and specialized. Long 
before Bush v. Gore, there were firms and consultants that specialized in 
recounting ballots and lawyers who had mastered the arcane rules that govern 
them. Disqualifying ballots was a recognized political expertise. This trend has 
only intensified since Bush v. Gore. Each party recruits teams of lawyers to 
watch for ballot irregularities and to file motions in court if necessary.162 The 
lasting effect of Bush v. Gore is the prolongation of electoral contests: political 
warfare does not conclude when ballots are cast. 
3. Shelby County’s Effect 
These innate features of American election administration, coupled with 
heightened political incentive to tamper with election administration for 
partisan goals, pose grave dangers for minority voting rights.163 Without 
section 5,164 minorities are left with the more limited and uncertain scope of 
                                                                                                                     
 159 For a discussion of the Ohio and Florida election disputes, see supra notes 153–54, 
156–58 and accompanying text. 
 160 Australian federal elections, for instance, are run by a single, independent 
administrative agency. Kenneth R. Mayer, Comparative Election Administration: Can We 
Learn Anything From the Australian Electoral Commission? 11 (2007) (unpublished 
paper), https://works.bepress.com/mayer/17/download/ [https://perma.cc/7ZJ6-HZAU]. For 
further discussion of how Australian federal elections are run, see id. at 9–15. This method 
of administering elections is not unusual among developed democracies. Shaheen Mozaffar 
& Andreas Schedler, The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance—Introduction, 23 
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 5, 15 (2002). 
 161 Daniel P. Tokaji, Teaching Election Administration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 675, 686 
(2012). 
 162 See Erick Trickey, How Hostile Poll-Watchers Could Hand Pennsylvania to 
Trump, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/2016-
election-pennsylvania-polls-voters-trump-clinton-214297 [https://perma.cc/5GZF-RWBW] 
(discussing the use of “poll watchers” in the current election). 
 163 These dangers include the introduction of voter ID laws, cutbacks to early voting, 
same day registration and other reforms adopted to expand access to the polls, and the 
resurgence of dual registration systems. See generally Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation 
After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675 (2014). 
 164 Section 5 was especially important in protecting minorities’ access to the ballot. 
Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. 
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section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and constitutional provisions to protect their 
voting rights. 
Even more fundamentally, minorities are left only with the tool of 
litigation to safeguard their rights. Litigation has two main pitfalls: (1) it is 
necessarily selective in the way it enforces rights, and (2) it is retrospective 
rather than prospective. Section 5 put the burden on jurisdictions to justify 
changes they wanted to make to election administration.165 Those potentially 
affected had the status quo on their side—the burden of persuasion was on the 
jurisdiction. Without section 5, minorities have to rely on affirmative 
litigation. Given the decentralized nature of election administration, the costs 
are stacked significantly against minority plaintiffs. For instance, while 
statewide reductions like those in Texas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin were 
challenged by large coalitional lawsuits, including sometimes the Department 
of Justice, many localized changes could easily have a large effect—but not 
large enough to be worth high litigation costs. To borrow an analogy from 
Justice Ginsburg in Shelby County, battling the multi-headed hydra166 will 
require going after some heads and not others, leaving some grave harms 
necessarily unremedied. 
Section 5 preclearance is arguably more important for the protection of 
minorities from manipulations of the electoral process than from redistricting 
plans. This is because localized electoral changes can happen quickly, and 
often without outside consultation or scrutiny. Redistricting, by contrast, is 
slow and public. The public is often invited to participate through notice and 
comment. And as a legislative act, many decision-making processes are open 
to members of the public and the press.167 Administrative changes, especially 
at the local level, can occur quickly with little to no public notice. Because 
decisions about whether to close a polling place or offer changed hours for 
early voting can sometimes be innocuous, members of the public or even the 
press may not be aware of or care about these changes. Section 5 was 
especially valuable because the Department of Justice was notified of these 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 189, 190 (1983). Preclearance scrutinized many things, among them changes made to 
registration requirements, id. at 198–201, and changes in polling locations, id. at 201. 
 165 About Section 5, supra note 84. 
 166 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633 (2013). 
 167 In the 2010 round of redistricting in Florida, for instance, public hearings were 
held. Redistricting: Public Hearings 2011, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session 
/Redistricting/Hearings [https://perma.cc/3VSG-KMVS]. The public was also invited to 
submit plans of their own. See Redistricting: Submitted Plans, FLA. SENATE, 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Redistricting/Plans?type=State%20Senate&from=ALL&
sortBy=PlanDate&sortOrder=descending [https://perma.cc/S3DV-4QQE]. Arizona is 
similar, even though redistricting is conducted by an independent redistricting commission. 
The commission conducts three weeks of public hearings, and takes public comment for a 
minimum of thirty days. Rhonda L. Barnes, Comment, Redistricting in Arizona Under the 
Proposition 106 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation and Regret, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
575, 580 (2003). 
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often minute administrative changes, and was therefore able to monitor them 
or seek more information if their motive or effect was unclear. 
Litigation is also necessarily reactive, not proactive. It can only be 
employed after an evil has occurred. And litigation moves at a slow pace. 
While changes to election administration are often challenged immediately 
after they become law, obtaining an injunction that prevents such a law from 
taking effect can be difficult without hard evidence that the law will do harm. 
The burden of proof puts advocates in the position of having to prove a 
hypothetical harm. 
In the North Carolina litigation, advocates sought a preliminary injunction 
before the midterms, and since they could not muster evidence on the possible 
deleterious effects on the law, the law was allowed to take effect.168 During 
the actual trial, the judge denied the permanent injunction in part based on 
evidence from the November midterms, in which turnout did not decrease.169 
It is hard to use turnout to measure the effect of a law,170 but advocates are 
often hard-pressed to rely on such defective evidence when persuasive, causal 
evidence is difficult, if not impossible, to find.171 The core issue is whether a 
qualification or procedure imposes an unequal and unnecessary burden on 
disadvantaged voters, not whether nonprofit and party-related groups can find 
ways to compensate for this burden by turning out other voters or expending 
additional resources. 
4. Remaining Doctrinal Solutions 
a. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Predating the Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
available to voters seeking to challenge discriminatory electoral practices.172 
The availability of the Voting Rights Act, especially the preclearance regime, 
obviated the need to rely on the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: 
discriminatory practices were either banned or failed to be precleared. After 
                                                                                                                     
 168 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 372 (M.D.N.C.), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North 
Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 169 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, No. 1:13CV658, 2016 WL 1650774, at 
*17 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2016), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), motion to stay denied, 
No. 16A168, 2016 WL 4535259 (S. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (mem.).  
 170 Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 276 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Higginson, 
J., concurring) (citing various sources). 
 171 Looking to change in turnout as a way to measure the effect of a voting law is not 
only faulty inferential practice, but may be legally quite beside the point. For a discussion 
of why the burden on the right to vote should be assessed at the individual, rather than 
aggregate level, see Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in 
Section 2 Voting Denial Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 769–75 (2016). See also Veasey, 
830 F.3d at 260 n.58. 
 172 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Shelby County, the Fourteenth Amendment may become important again in 
setting a constitutional floor on discriminatory practices. Yet given structural 
defects in the doctrine itself, and the Court’s reluctance to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment aggressively, the Fourteenth Amendment’s ability to prevent 
discretionary but discriminatory election administration changes from going 
through is doubtful.  
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on proving a Fourteenth Amendment 
discrimination violation requires proving discriminatory intent.173 Intent is 
difficult to prove because there are usually at least facially reasonable reasons 
to erect administrative barriers to voting. Preventing ballot fraud is the most 
common rationale, even though there is little documented evidence of 
widespread and systematic in-person voter fraud.174 But there is also as yet no 
strong evidence that restrictive voting qualifications have either significantly 
reduced turnout among minority voters and Democrats or boosted confidence 
in the integrity of the electoral system.175 And in the case of removing existing 
voting measures, jurisdictions can always present the rationale of cost 
reduction. 
The intent requirement presents not only a substantive barrier to these 
cases, but also a psychological one. Judges are hesitant to find a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation because it means calling legislators or government 
officials who passed these laws racist. And judges’ observation and awareness 
of conjoined polarization adds to this hesitation—racial outcomes may be a 
result of primarily partisan factors. In other words, conjoined polarization may 
operate as an excuse for racially discriminatory outcomes. 
The contrast in findings between the Fourth Circuit in the North Carolina 
photo ID case176 and the Fifth Circuit in the Texas photo ID case177 
demonstrates this point. The Fourth Circuit, after finding that the North 
Carolina election law had a discriminatory effect at the preliminary injunction 
stage,178 found that the law was implemented with discriminatory intent. It 
arrived at this finding after interrogating the history of voting rights in North 
Carolina and all the circumstances of the passage of the law. It gave great 
weight to the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
                                                                                                                     
 173 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (finding that 
discriminatory purpose requires a course of action to be taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in 
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
 174 See Levitt, supra note 54; see also MINNITE, supra note 54, at 5–7; Schultz, supra 
note 54, at 494–501. 
 175 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 146. 
 176 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016), motion 
to stay denied, No. 16A168, 2016 WL 4535259 (S. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (mem.). The case 
did not only involve a challenge to North Carolina’s voter ID law, but also other 
components of the law involving cutbacks to early voting, same day registration, out-of-
precinct voting, and pre-registration (registering eligible voters at the age of sixteen so that 
they can vote immediately upon turning eighteen). Id. at 216–18.  
 177 Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 260 n.58 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 178 N.C. State Conf., 831 F.3d at 233. 
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Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,179 which listed the circumstantial 
evidence courts can take into account in finding discriminatory intent.180 In 
essence, the court was willing to look to both context and subtext of the law. 
By looking holistically,181 the court was able to discern a discriminatory 
purpose. 
The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, struggled with a finding of discriminatory 
intent. Even when faced with the extensive record found by the District Court, 
the court needed more evidence of intent before it was willing to make such a 
finding.182 It was reluctant to take anything but recent history into account183 
and to impute the statements of a few legislators to the rest of the 
legislature.184 By requiring proof of discriminatory intent at a highly granular 
level, the Fifth Circuit decision forces courts to squint even harder than the 
District Court in the case already did for a finding of discriminatory intent. 
With section 5, the Department of Justice evaluated whether any change in 
ballot procedures would reduce the political opportunities of disadvantaged 
minority groups. The Department was able to apply a functional analysis to 
determine whether restrictive voting procedures were part of a systematic 
racial pattern of reducing minority power and political influence. But it is hard 
to see how the courts can intervene unless minority plaintiffs can show actual 
harm from voter ID laws, precinct consolidation, flawed voter purge 
procedures, and the like. 
b. Section 2 
After Shelby County, challenges to election administration will have to be 
channeled through section 2. Since section 2 uses an “effects” standard, and 
does not require a showing of intent, it avoids some of the pitfalls of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.185 Nevertheless, the applicability of section 2 to vote 
denial claims for changes in election administration is highly uncertain and 
speculative at this point. 
While the language of section 2 encompasses “[a]ny voting . . . practice[s] 
or procedure[s]” that discriminate against protected classes,186 the provision 
has been almost exclusively applied in what are known as vote dilution 
                                                                                                                     
 179 Id. at 220–21 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977)). 
 180 For instance, the historical background of a decision, departures from the normal 
procedural sequence, and the legislative or administrative history can all be taken into 
account. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. at 267–68. 
 181 The key difference in the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit and by the district 
court is in whether intent can be discerned holistically. See N.C. State Conf., 831 F.3d at 
223. 
 182 See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 232–33. 
 183 Id. at 232. 
 184 Id. at 232–33. 
 185 See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (Supp. II 2014). 
 186 Id. 
900 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:4 
cases.187 These are cases that fall primarily within the category described in 
the earlier Part of this Article concerning redistricting. Cases about changes to 
election administration are known as vote denial cases. They did not have to 
be brought under section 2 because the preclearance regime filtered out those 
election practices that would have created injuries amounting to vote denial. 
The challenge after Shelby County for both advocacy groups and courts is in 
translating section 2’s protections against vote dilution to vote denial cases. 
Advocacy groups, courts, and scholars have begun in earnest the work of 
operationalizing section 2 for vote denial cases. A main question that courts 
face is how much to borrow from the Gingles vote dilution line of cases.  
The Fourth Circuit’s position is that the vote dilution requirements should 
be imported directly into the vote denial context: proof of racial polarization 
would become a threshold requirement for vote denial cases as well.188 This 
approach has the benefit of experience: courts are familiar with racial 
polarization analysis in the redistricting context. But the Fourth Circuit has 
chosen to rely on the racial polarization test at a time when its utility is 
waning: as mentioned in Part III.A.2, conjoined polarization blurs the 
boundaries between racial polarization and political polarization.  
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach, applying a balancing test that 
includes the Senate factors from section 2.189 This borrows from a different 
doctrinal tradition: the Court’s constitutional cases on election administration. 
In the Fourth Circuit, after overcoming the racial polarization threshold, the 
court also applied a variation of this balancing approach. A robust version of 
the balancing/totality of the circumstances test could end up being quite 
similar to what the Department of Justice or a district court in the District of 
Columbia would have had to decide under the preclearance regime.190 But 
other courts may hesitate to apply such a robust version. Given the Court’s 
hostility to the preclearance formula, labeling it as “strong medicine,”191 
courts may choose to shy away from the application of a section 5-like 
                                                                                                                     
 187 For a discussion of the term vote denial, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The New 
Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 
(2006). See also Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(describing vote denial cases as involving “challenges to methods of electing 
representatives—like redistricting or at-large districts—as having the effect of diminishing 
minorities’ voting strength”), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 
2014). 
 188 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, at 221–22 (4th Cir. 2016), 
motion to stay denied, No. 16A168, 2016 WL 4535259 (S. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (mem.). 
 189 Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243–65 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Indeed, the 
Fourth Circuit seems to have taken a similar position of applying a balancing test in its 
opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the district court’s denial of preliminary 
injunction. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239–41 (4th 
Cir. 2014). 
 190 See League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 245–47. 
 191 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
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decision-making process. In that case, courts may define a “burden” in such a 
way as to exclude truly mundane or trivial voting changes. 
While the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly apply the constitutional test for 
the burden on the right to vote, its decision may be instructive in future cases if 
courts choose to adopt the balancing approach.192 The Court in Burdick v. 
Takushi answered the question of what constitutes a cognizable burden on the 
franchise.193 Registered voters challenged the Hawaii Director of Elections 
and others over Hawaii’s prohibition of a practice known as write-in balloting, 
which allows voters to vote for a candidate by writing his or her own name on 
a ballot instead of simply choosing among the candidates whose names appear 
on the ballot.194 The Court struggled with whether this prohibition on write-in 
balloting burdened the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.195 Elections laws “invariably impose some burden upon 
individual voters.”196 Anxious about getting courts involved in all 
administrative decisions regarding electoral administration, the Court 
established a flexible standard that weighs the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury caused by the election law against the state’s justification for 
the law.197 
To be sure, a balancing test has its pitfalls. The test suffers from a lack of 
consistency in how it is applied. But its flexibility also has advantages in the 
context of election administration. Applying a balancing test that draws from 
the Anderson-Burdick tradition will help sharpen section 2’s applicability to 
voting changes that are consequential and for which the state has no strong 
justification. It assuages the anxiety that district courts will be flooded with 
section 5 preclearance-like cases. Such a standard allows courts to adjudicate 
claims involving early voting and same-day registration, voting measures that 
affect large number of voters, and measures that have a disproportionate racial 
impact. 
c. Section 3 Bail-in 
Shelby County left open the possibility that jurisdictions might be “bailed 
in” to the preclearance regime under section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.198 
                                                                                                                     
 192 A balancing test under section 2 for vote denial cases can take on many different 
flavors. Consider, for example, Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote 
Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 613–17 (2013); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the 
New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 473–89 (2015); and Tokaji, supra note 
187, at 718–27. 
 193 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). A similar dilemma was presented in 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983). The test for whether a voting practice 
burdens the right to vote is hence informatively known as the Anderson-Burdick test.  
 194 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430. 
 195 See id. at 433–34. 
 196 Id. at 433. 
 197 Id. at 434. 
 198 See 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a), (c) (Supp. II 2014). 
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However, before a jurisdiction can be bailed in, a court must make a finding 
that the jurisdiction purposefully discriminated against minorities under the 
Constitution. The bail-in procedure is therefore not a workaround to the high 
constitutional bar set by the intent standard. Even a finding of discriminatory 
intent may not be sufficient to trigger a bail-in. For instance, after the Fourth 
Circuit found that the North Carolina legislature enacted election laws with a 
discriminatory purpose, it declined to bail North Carolina in under 
section 3.199 If the standard for bail-in is not only that a court must find that 
election changes were implemented with a discriminatory intent, then the bail-
in provision is not a viable remedial tool, except in the most extreme instances 
of manipulation of the electoral process to disadvantage minorities. 
It is also important to note that a judicial finding of a section 2 violation 
would not suffice to bail a jurisdiction in under preclearance. Therefore, the 
likeliest doctrinal tool that will be used to challenge, and perhaps find voting 
violations, will likely only provide one-off remedies. Even the rare victories 
may only be short-lived. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As with redistricting, the conflation of racial, party, and ideological 
motives makes it hard for minority voters who have been adversely and 
differentially affected by restrictive voter qualifications to prove intentional 
discrimination. The standard will therefore have to be discriminatory effects. 
In the 1960s, poll taxes and literacy tests dramatically suppressed African-
American voting.200 In the redistricting context, the courts tolerate moderate 
levels of partisan discrimination in line-drawing, even though when it affects 
Democrats it can also have negative consequences for racial minorities. 
Applying the same tolerance to discriminatory voter restrictions will severely 
erode minority voting rights. 
The temptation to manipulate the electoral system—through the placement 
of district lines or the administration of elections—for racial advantage will 
not abate unless party coalitions become more heterogeneous again. The 
Republican post-2012 autopsy recommended broadening its racial and ethnic 
appeal, in recognition of demographic trends.201 The Trump nomination shut 
that option down in 2016. Conjoined polarization could still lessen in the 
future, but in the interim, the overlap of racial with partisan motives increases 
the urgency of putting limits on political manipulation. With no immediate 
prospects of fixing section 5 and given the still limited application of equal 
protection to electoral administration after Bush v. Gore, the voting rights 
                                                                                                                     
 199 N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016), motion 
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 200 See Davidson, supra note 13, at 13. 
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community will need to devise some other means to limit the mischiefs of 
conjoined polarization. 
One answer might be to make better use of the totality of circumstances 
test to identify holistic patterns of partisan and racial discrimination that have 
the effect of undercutting the political influence of racial and ethnic minorities. 
States that both pass restrictive voter qualification legislation and engage in 
partisan redistricting practices that negatively affect racial and ethnic 
minorities deserve special scrutiny. Is it simply a coincidence that states like 
North Carolina, Texas, and Florida have passed both restrictive election 
administration bills and partisan gerrymanders in the last decade? The timing 
of such efforts (i.e., just after a change in party control and before an election) 
should also trigger concern. A holistic assessment under section 2, borrowed 
from the Anderson-Burdick test, of the burdens on voting weighed against the 
state’s justification for imposing those burdens may help remedy some of the 
most egregious attempts to erode minority voting rights after Shelby County. 
Additionally, rights-restricting efforts should be treated differently from 
rights-enhancing efforts or even maintaining the status quo.202 The right to 
vote is a First Amendment right. Since the Court regards efforts to cap or limit 
speech as inherently odious, it should regard efforts to limit the fundamental 
right to vote with suspicion as well. If a state or jurisdiction asserts that it must 
increase the cost and inconvenience of voting, it should provide solid evidence 
that there is a problem that requires the proposed measures. And if there is 
evidence of a need to boost ballot security, the administrative solution should 
be narrowly tailored to ease the burden on vulnerable populations. 
For doctrine to take more seriously the difference between rights-
restricting and rights-enhancing efforts in the context of voting rights is 
unremarkable given that such a distinction is often made in other areas of law. 
In the context of obtaining a preliminary injunction, for instance, many courts 
make the distinction between a status-quo-altering injunction (i.e., mandatory 
injunction) and one that merely preserves the status quo (i.e., prohibitionary 
injunction).203 Injunctions that seek to alter the status quo are subject to a 
heightened burden of proof: the theory behind the doctrine is that the 
presumption ought to be in favor of preserving the status quo.204 While 
commentators seem to generally disfavor the distinction in the context of 
preliminary injunction doctrine,205 the presumption against change in voter 
qualifications and means of casting ballots makes good sense. It allows courts 
                                                                                                                     
 202 Some commentators believe that the Voting Rights Act itself makes this distinction. 
See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 171, at 779–85.Therefore, cutbacks to voting opportunities are 
actionable under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See id. 
 203 For a discussion of how courts approach these two different kinds of injunctions, 
see generally Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 109 (2001). 
 204 See id. at 110. 
 205 See, e.g., id. at 166. 
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to err on the side of protecting minority voting rights while still permitting the 
state to make changes in justified ways. 
Certainly, if the Court decides to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering 
claims, it would obviate much of the quagmire it has created over the years on 
how racial motivations may be disentangled from partisan ones. But if not, the 
Court is limited doctrinally in what it can do with respect to redistricting. The 
courts need assistance from the political process to arrive at a definition of 
political fairness. Without political guidance, there is no clear path from the 
U.S. Constitution to any particular fairness standard. Proportional 
representation, the most intuitive standard, has been ruled out. But if states or 
local jurisdictions could agree on some standard, it would be possible to limit 
political unfairness to some reasonable and measurable amount. 
Political scientists have suggested a number of alternative measures in 
addition to proportional representation deriving from the symmetry and slope 
of the seats-vote curve.206 Recent advances in computation will allow them in 
the near future to generate large samples or the entire population of feasible 
fully balanced plans for Congress or the state legislature in any given state.207 
A proposed plan could be measured against all possible alternative plans with 
respect to each of the criteria, including equal population, to identify outliers. 
If a state adopts legislation that stipulates that any plan must be no more 
disproportionate or asymmetric than 75% of all possible fully balanced plans 
(i.e., meeting all the criteria as well), this would give the courts enough 
guidance to limit political unfairness. 
Many reformers regard the decentralized structure of American 
government as an obstacle to sensible election administration reform. One 
redeeming feature of the U.S. political system is that it fractures efforts to 
manipulate the political system. The biases of one state’s redistricting often 
offset those of another. Conjoined polarization has nationalized racial 
polarization and created a more widespread problem than in the immediate 
post-World War II period when racial discrimination was more heavily 
concentrated in certain regions. The challenge is to develop new evidence-
based approaches to meet these new circumstances. 
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